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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-Union Program of 
Hiring Attorneys Is Unauthorized Practice of Law-
Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers 
of America* 
District 12 of the United Mine Workers (UMW) employed an 
attorney on a salary basis to prosecute members' claims under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Members were free to employ other 
counsel, but if they sought help from the union lawyer, the union 
agreed not to interfere with the attorney-client relationship. The 
attorney prepared his case from filed reports of the accidents, and, 
generally, his first contact with the union member was when they 
appeared before the Commission.1 Since the attorney was compen-
sated by the union, the entire amount received in award or settle-
ment went to the member. The Illinois Bar Association brought 
suit to restrain the UMW from continuing this program, alleging 
that the hiring of an attorney by a lay organization for the purpose 
of prosecuting individuals' claims constituted the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. Over the UMW's objections that the first and fourteenth 
amendments protected the plan, the Circuit Court of Sangamon 
County granted the relief sought. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme 
Court, held, affirmed. Unions who hire attorneys to prosecute mem-
bers' claims are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and 
such activity is not protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.2 
The legal profession has long struggled to prevent lay organiza-
tions from injecting themselves into the practice of law by recom-
mending to or hiring for other parties attorneys who would give 
legal advice or perform other legal services. Repeatedly, courts have 
held such lay intermediary organizations to be engaged in the un-
authorized practice of law particularly when there were financial 
connections between the organization and the attorneys.3 One of 
• 219 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1966) (hereinafter referred to as principal case]. 
1. The attorney is available for conferences on certain days at particular locations, 
but as a general rule the members do not take advantage of this. Principal case at 505. 
2. The power to regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of the 
judicial department as one of the three divisions of government created by the 
Constitution. People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937). 
3. E.g., American Auto. Ass'n v. Merrick, 117 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Columbus 
Dar Ass'n v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N.E.2d 728 (1963); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. 
Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 178 N.E.2d 782 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 861 (1962). The 
practices connected with lay intermediaries also violate Canons 27, 28, 35, and 47 
of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics: 
Canon 27. Advertisini:, Direct or Indirect: 
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, 
through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by 
personal relations. • • • 
Canon 28. Stirring Up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents: 
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except 
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the early programs of a lay organization was established during the 
depression by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. 4 Prior to the 
program, union members who were injured on the job were often 
either induced to make a quick settlement by the claim adjuster for 
the employer or fell prey to an incompetent attorney who, eager to 
make a quick dollar, would take an inadequate settlement.11 In an 
effort to promote their members' chances for a fair recovery, the 
Brotherhood instituted a program of recommending particular at-
torneys to the injured union member. In 1958, the Illinois Supreme 
in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do 
so. . • • It is disreputable • • • to breed litigation by seeking out those with 
claims for personal injuries •.• in order to secure them as clients, or to employ 
agents or rUDileIS for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, 
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office • • • • 
Canon 85. Intermediaries: 
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by 
any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and 
lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should 
avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the inter-
est of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, 
and the responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable societies rendering 
aid to the indigent are not deemed such intermediaries. 
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an associa-
tion, club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which 
the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not in-
clude the rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in 
respect to their individual affairs. 
Canon 47. Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law: 
No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in the 
aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, 
personal or corporate. 
4. Under the Brotherhood's plan, the United States is divided into 16 regions. 
The Brotherhood selects a lawyer in each region with a reputation of skill in railroad 
injury litigation. When there is an accident, the secretary of the local lodge urges 
the injured member or his family to retain the designated counsel. See Bodle, Group 
Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 806, 310-11 (1965). 
5. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8-4, 
rehearing denied, 877 U.S. 960 (1964). However, it is questionable whether this reason 
for the Brotherhood's extensive arrangement is as strong today. See Note, 59 Nw. U.L. 
REv. 821, 881 (1965), where the author points out that "the pool of competent counsel 
is much greater than in 1930 when the program was instituted and systems for advising 
low-income, uninformed persons of the availability of legal assistance are much more 
developed. Most metropolitan areas have a lawyer referral service." Mr. Justice Clark 
made a similar observation in his dissent in Brotherhood, After noting the seriousness 
of calling the legal profession incompetent, he stated: 
In the cases that I have passed on here-numbering about 177 during the past 
15 years-I dare say that counsel for the railroad employee has exhibited advo-
cacy not inferior to that of his opponent (although l do not remember that 
any one of the 16 approved attorneys appeared in these cases). Indeed, the rail-
road employee has prevailed in practically all of the cases and the recoveries 
have ranged as high as $625,000. 
377 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting). The economic advantages of the program 
still exist and inure to the members, however, since it is apparent that when one 
handles numerous cases concerning the same legal matter, each case becomes less 
expensive and consequently the attorney can charge the client a smaller fee. Schwartz, 
Foreword to Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 279, 285-86 (1965); 
Comment, 28 LEGAL Am BRIEF CAsE 72 (1964). 
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Court had an opportunity to consider one variation of the Brother-
hood's program.6 At that time, the union attorneys were not com-
pensated by a salary, but rather were required to charge a contingent 
fee established by the union; in addition, the attorneys were to ad-
vance all costs related to the disposition of the claim, finance the 
union's legal aid department, and compensate local lodge members 
who investigated accidents and urged injured members to consult 
the regional counsel.7 The court did not enjoin operation of the 
entire program, but it did restrict its scope as follows: (1) The Broth-
erhood could maintain an investigative staff, conduct investigations, 
and make reports available to the members, but such investigations 
had to be financed directly by the union membership; (2) it could 
inform the members of the advisability of obtaining legal advice 
before making a settlement and could furnish names of competent 
attorneys; (3) it could not have any financial connection with the 
attorneys, nor could it fix the fees to be charged; and (4) when it 
discovered non-union-approved attorneys engaging in such unethical 
practices as soliciting injured members or charging excessive fees, 
the Brotherhood would have to file a complaint with the grievance 
committee of the local bar association rather than establishing a 
competitive union-approved solicitation program. The court be-
lieved that if the Brotherhood were to adhere to these restrictions, 
it would be able to accomplish its objective of providing adequate 
legal assistance for its members without engaging in the practice of 
law.8 
Each court that had considered the Brotherhood's program while 
there was a financial connection between the attorney and the union 
had, like the Illinois Supreme Court, condemned the arrangement.9 
Subsequently, the Brotherhood revised its plan so as to eliminate 
any financial connection between the union and attorney in accord-
ance with the Illinois court's guidelines. As revised, the Brother-
6. In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958). 
7. For a factual history of the Brotherhood's plan, see Hulse v. Brotherhood of 
R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W .2d 404 (Mo. 1960). 
8. 13 Ill. 2d at 397-98, 150 N.E.2d at 167-68. 
9. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir 1956); In re O'Neill, 
5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 
(1950); In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 III. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958); 
Hulse v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960); Doughty v. 
Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952). But see Dombey, Tyler, Richard & 
Grieser v. Detroit, T. &: I. R.R., 226 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Ohio 1964); Ryan v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932). Since these latter cases dealt primarily with 
the right of the designated attorney to collect his contingent fee, they considered the 
legal aid arrangement only to the extent that it affected recovery. Both courts allowed 
the attorney to recover, and Ryan expressed approval of the plan, although this 
dictum was immediately repudiated by statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 13, § 15 (1957), 
and later by In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, supra. 
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hood's plan was still enjoined in Virginia.10 On appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court,11 the union contended that its constitutional 
rights had been violated by that portion of the Richmond Chancery 
Court's decree which prohibited it from recommending attorneys 
and giving advice as to the prosecution of claims.12 The Court, ac-
cepting this argument, held that the rights of the railroad workers 
to associate, help, and advise one another in asserting their rights 
under the Safety Appliance Act13 and Federal Employers' Liability 
Act14 were protected from state interference by the first and four-
teenth amendment freedoms of speech, petition and assembly.15 
The Court admitted that Virginia had broad powers to regulate the 
practice of law, but found that they were not broad enough to fore-
close constitutional rights.16 Indeed, since neither the union nor 
the lawyers were engaged in any solicitation, Virginia was not even 
halting the commercialization of the legal profession, which the 
Court conceded "might threaten the moral and ethical fabric of 
the administration of justice."17 On remand, the Richmond Chan-
cery Court revised its original decree so as to conform with the 
Supreme Court's holding, but it interpreted the holding as pro-
tecting only the right to advise and recommend, not solicitation 
and commercialization.18 However, the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals rejected this interpretation of Brotherhood, for it found 
that the Supreme Court had not made any distinction between rec-
10. Virginia State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, (Richmond, Va. Ch., 
Jan. 29, 1962). On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Brotherhood main-
tained and the Supreme Court accepted the contention that since 1959 the Brother-
hood had no financial connection with the designated attorneys. Brotherhood of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 n.9 (1964). 
11. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, supra note 10. 
12. The Brotherhood objected specifically to the provision which enjoined it 
from holding out lawyers selected by it as the only approved lawyers to aid the 
members or their families; ..• or in any other manner soliciting or encouraging 
such legal employment of the selected lawyers; •.• and from doing any act or 
combination of acts, and from formulating and putting into practice any plan, 
pattern or design, the result of which is to channel legal employment to any 
particular lawyer or group of lawyers • • • • 
Id. at 4-5. 
13. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 26, 27 (1964). 
14. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1964). 
15. We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of 
the members through their Brotherhood to maintain and carry out their plan 
for advising workers who are injured to obtain legal advice and for recommending 
specific lawyers. Since the part of the decree to which the Brotherhood objects 
infringes those rights, it cannot stand; and to the extent any other part of the 
decree forbids these activities it too must fall. 
377 U.S. at 8; see Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960), where the 
Court stated that it is beyond dispute that freedom of association is protected from 
state interference by the fourteenth amendment. 
16. 377 U.S. at 6. 
17. Id. at 6-7. 
18. Virginia State Bar v. Railroad Trainmen, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2387 (Richmond, 
Va. Ch., Jan. 15, 1965); see Simpson, Group Legal Services: The Case for Caution, 12, 
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 327 (1965). 
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ommendation and solicitation and that consequently both were 
protected.19 
Assuming, arguendo, that solicitation and commercialization are 
rights which fall within the protections of the first and fourteenth 
amendments, these rights are not absolute.20 If the state can show 
that solicitation and commercialization pose a threat to an appre-
ciable public interest, abridgement of these rights may be permit-
ted to the extent necessary to protect the public interest.21 While 
the Supreme Court has used different tests to determine whether 
the requisite state interest is sufficient to justify regulation of the 
rights,22 in Brotherhood it appears to adopt the "balancing" test, 
that is, balancing associational rights against the state's interest in 
regulating its legal profession.23 Thus, if the state can show specific 
evils flowing from the type of associational conduct under question, 
which Virginia was unable to do in Brotherhood, it can, to the ex-
tent necessary to protect the public interest, regulate or prohibit 
such conduct.24 
The decision in the principal case is consistent with the court's 
earlier decision regarding the Brotherhood25 and although it en-
joined the present plan, it is not inconsistent with the previously 
discussed Supreme Court decision26 since the UMW went beyond 
solicitation by employing an attorney on a salary basis. However, 
the fact that the UMW paid an attorney's salary is not necessarily 
sufficient to justify invalidating the program. In N AA GP v. 
Button,21 the Supreme Court upheld an arrangement whereby the 
NAACP paid attorneys on a daily basis to represent individual 
members in court proceedings that were aimed at either establishing 
or protecting the members' civil rights. Although some of the. indi-
19. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 207 Va. 182, 
149 S.E.2d 265 (1966) (Carrico, J., dissenting). 
20. E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958); American Communications Ass'n v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-95 (1950). 
21. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, supra note 20; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, supra note 20. 
22. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dis-
senting) ("absolute" test); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 
(1950) ("balancing" test); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ("bad tendency" 
test); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("clear and present danger" test). 
23. See 377 U.S. at 8. Mr. Justice Black suggests that the failure of Virginia "to 
show any appreciable public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying 
out its plan" is crucial to the invalidity of the injunction. Thus, although Mr. Justice 
Black is considered an absolutist with respect to first amendment rights, he appears 
to have adopted the "balancing" test here. See generally Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 1693 
(1965). 
24. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 398-400 (1950); 
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). 
25. In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958). 
26. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
27. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
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viduals who were represented by the NAACP attorneys requested 
counsel, the NAACP usually solicited and urged aggrieved Negroes 
to allow the attorneys to help them. The Court held that these 
activities were a form of political expression and a type of associ-
ation protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.28 Conse-
quently, Virginia could not restrain this program under the guise 
of regulating the legal profession since it had failed to advance any 
substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flow-
ing from the NAACP's activities, which would justify the regula-
tion imposed.29 
While it is arguable that the UMW program is similarly privi-
leged, Button may be distinguished from the principal case on four 
separate grounds. First, the legal services provided by the NAACP 
in Button were designed to effectuate a group purpose30 and it is 
well established that a group may hire an attorney to represent an 
individual where the interests of the entire group or a substantial 
part thereof are involved.81 In such a situation, there can be no 
conflict of interest between the group and the individual since their 
goals are identical.82 However, the UMW program is designed pri-
marily for the benefit of the individual member, and in certain 
instances, the union's interests might conflict with those of the indi-
vidual. For example, in an attempt to improve employer relations, 
a union might promote lower out-of-court settlements which could 
be detrimental to the injured party.83 Second, the litigation in 
Button was a form of constitutionally-protected expression, for only 
through the judicial process was the Negro able to protect his con-
stitutional rights.34 No such right is associated with personal injury 
28. Id. at 429. 
29. Id. at 444. 
30. See Note, Group Legal Services: The Bench, the Bar, and the Brotherhood, 17 
VANI>, L. R.Ev. 1490 (1964). 
31. American Auto. Ass'n v. Merrick, 117 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1940); see Maurer, 
Ethical and Legal Problems of the Corporate Counsel in the Rendering of Personal 
Advice to Company Officers and Employees, 21 Bus. LAw. 817-18 (1966). 
32. But see 371 U.S. 415, 461-63 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice- Harlan 
feels there is potential conflict between the objectives of the NAACP and the 
individual Negro. 
33. Additional instances of a possible conflict between the union's interest and 
that of the individual can readily be found. Consider, for example, that a union 
might wish to establish a series of spectacular recoveries in order to demonstrate the 
success of its program; consequently it might try to exert pressure on a regional 
counsel to settle all cases which do not promise favorable publicity. Similarly, if an 
injured member brings a suit and wants to call a fellow employee as a witness, the 
union may believe that in order to protect the witness' job, it should discourage 
such testimony. See Comment, 11 STAN, L. REv. 394 (1959); Note, 43 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 
254 (1964); Note, 51 VA. L. R.Ev. 1693 (1965). 
34. In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving 
private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality 
of treatment by all government, federal, state, and local, for members of the 
Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. 
871 U.S. at 429. 
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litigation.35 Third, abuses that normally accompany solicitation and 
lay intermediaries, such as pecuniary gain and the commercializa-
tion of the legal profession, were absent in Button36 whereas the 
UMW plan contains both abuses since the sole objective of the at-
torney is monetary reward and as a by-product of his relationship 
with the union, he is supplied with a fertile field for clients in areas 
other than workmen's compensation. Finally, in Button, the Court 
suggests first that Virginia's motive was to stifle the Civil Rights 
movement by preventing the Negro from using the one potent 
weapon he possessed-litigation in the courts,37 and second that 
there was a dearth of attorneys who were willing to represent the 
Negro.38 In the situation posed by the principal case, Illinois is not 
trying to inhibit the granting of workmen's compensation awards 
and there is no indication that attorneys are unwilling to handle 
these lucrative claims. 
Despite the fact that the arrangement in Button is factually dis-
tinguishable from that in the principal case, there are three factors 
which indicate that the UMW program could be legitimately up-
held. First, although the Supreme Court emphasized that the plan 
in Button was a constitutionally-privileged means of expression 
which was used to secure guaranteed civil rights,39 it refused to use 
this factor to distinguish Brotherhood from Button. Indeed, in hold-
ing that the Brotherhood's legal aid plan was protected by the first 
amendment, the Court relied heavily on Button and did not deem 
significant the fact that Brotherhood did not involve a form of 
political expression.4° Consequently, it should be equally insignifi-
cant that the principal case does not involve a type of political 
expression. Second, in Brotherhood the Court alluded to the British 
system whereby the unions retain counsel to prosecute members' 
claims.41 Because of the differences between the legal professions in 
Britain and the United States, it cannot be said with certainty that 
the Court meant to condone such a system.42 However, the appar-
35. "Personal injury litigation is not a form of political expression, but rather a 
procedure for the settlement of damage claims. No guaranteed civil right is involved." 
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) 
(Clark, J., dissenting). But see Gaines, Conduct of Attorneys: Group Practice and 
Representation, and Significant Developments in Ohio Disciplinary Matters, 16 W. 
R.Es. L. REV. 893 (1965). 
36. The per diem payment to the NAACP attorney is smaller than that ordinarily 
received for equivalent private professional work. 371 U.S. at 420·21. But see id. at 
457-60 (Harlan J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 435-36. 
38. Id. at 443. 
39. Id. at 428-42. 
40. 377 U.S. at 6, 10. 
41. Id. at 7. 
42. The British legal profession differs in two significant ways: (1) The contingent 
fee is forbidden so that legal assistance would often be unavailable to the average 
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ently favorable reference would seem to indicate that the C...ourt did 
not find such a system, which is similar to the UMW program, 
unpalatable.43 Third, the Brotherhood's goal of promoting the wel-
fare of its members is consistent with the interests of the individual 
members, and one of the ways to accomplish this goal is to establish 
a program that assures all members adequate compensation for 
in juries suffered. 
Although it is thus unclear whether the Supreme Court would 
uphold a program such as the one in the principal case, the prob-
lems and abuses which could result from such a program appear 
sufficiently serious to justify the decision of the Illinois Supreme 
Court. The foremost of the possible abuses is the threatened demise 
of the attorney-client relationship. That the demise of the relation-
ship is an actual result of this type of arrangement and not just a 
theoretical possibility was evidenced by the fact that the attorney 
does not discuss the accident with the client prior to the filing of 
a claim with the Industrial Commission, but rather prepares his 
case from filed reports. However, a personal attorney-client relation-
ship based on trust and confidence is thought to be a bulwark 
against the legal profession's degenerating into the mere money 
making trade it had become before the turn of the century.44 Fur-
thermore, as a consequence of the procedural aspects of the UMW 
plan, the attorney might miss facts that would have an important 
bearing on the case, 45 and viewed from the other perspective, since 
he receives the same salary regardless of the adequacy of the settle-
ment of the claim, the attorney might lack the incentive to devote 
the extra effort which may be required in order to obtain a better 
settlement for his client.46 Finally, although theoretically the union 
injury victim in absence of a legal aid program, Shipley, The Contingent Fee, 23 
D.C.B.A.J. 651, 656 (1956); and (2) The legal profession is partially socialized, see 
CHEATHAM, CASES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 517 (2d ed. 1955). These two factors sug-
gest the reason if not the justification for British leniency toward such programs. 
43. See Bodle, supra note 4, at 323, where the author suggests that the Court did 
comment favorably on the British plan. 
44. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 24-25 (1953); Note, 10 VILL. L. REV. 370 (1965). 
45. Times were set aside for consultation with the attorney, but apparently they 
were not used. If such consultation periods had been utilized, perhaps the problem 
would have been alleviated. See note 1 supra. 
46. It has been suggested that there are also abuses to the contingent fee system. 
Thus, a lawyer might settle rather than litigate if the larger award derived from liti-
gation is not proportionately great enough to outweigh the additional time the attor-
ney must spend preparing for such litigation. Also, where workmen's compensation 
claims or other personal injury actions are involved, frequently one attorney has 
a number of claims against one company or one insurer. In such situations, bargaining 
frequently takes the form of "lump sum settlement," that is, negotiation of all cases 
with no breakdown for each individual case. Such settlements, by their very nature, 
tend to make the aggregate recovery inadequate, and opportunity for abuse is pro-
vided by the necessity of apportioning the total sum among the clients involved. 
Furthermore, the merits of each case may get only a cursory appraisal resulting in 
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is not to interfere with the relationship, it does pay the attorney 
and in light of other instances wherein unions have readily sacri-
ficed the rights of an individual for the good of the union, 47 it 
would seem that interference may be more probable than not. 
The second abuse is the possible commercialization of the legal 
profession. Not only can the attorney use the union to supply him 
with clients in areas other than workmen's compensation, but the 
union also has an opportunity to capitalize on these legal services. 
By spreading the cost of the attorney's salary over the entire mem-
bership, the union could theoretically gain monetarily if it assesses 
its members a greater amount than it pays to the attorney. How-
ever, the union's real profit will come from its advertising of legal 
services and spectacular recoveries as inducements for joining the 
union.48 It would also be possible for the union to exploit its influ-
ential position regarding the prosecution of injury claims in its 
dealings with the employer. It is known that unions will trade cer-
tain employee grievances for the satisfaction of others and that 
every employee may not have the opportunity to have his grievance 
heard by the arbitrator.49 Thus, in return for the employer's agree-
ment to satisfy certain grievances in which the union has a special 
interest, the union might agree to see that the union attorney did 
not push the prosecution of a specific injury claim. Using legal 
services as a tool to accomplish these selfish ends degrades the legal 
profession and impairs the public's confidence in it. 
Certainly injured union members need, and the union has an 
inadequate recovery for some clients. See Luther, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solici-
tation, 44 A.B.A.J. 554, 555 (1958). This is most likely to happen when workmen's 
compensation claims are involved for two reasons: (1) an attorney is very likely to 
have a number of claims against one employer or insurer; and (2) since the attorney's 
fee is usually fixed by the Commission, the attorney must engage in "mass pro-
duction" settlement of claims in order to make the work most lucrative. 
47. See, e.g., Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. &: S.S. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 
1963); Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). 
48. In a survey by a committee of the California State Bar on group legal services, 
many instances were found when union newspapers advertised the availability of 
legal services to union members. 'Whether this advertising was done with or without 
the knowledge or permission of the attorney involved was not known. An example 
of one such advertisement is as follows: 
One of the little known rights arising by reason of • • . union membership is the 
right to the services of our legal staff for advice on legal affairs that are strictly 
personal problems, and to secure this, the average worker quite properly believes 
the cost would probably outweigh the value received from the advice given. In 
our union, the right to such legal advice is part of the value of the benefits that 
the union membership brings you. If upon consultation with the attorney, you 
wish him to act for you in any legal action, you make your own arrangements 
in the financial way as you see fit but the initial advice is taken care of in our 
retainer fee with the attorney. 
Standing Committee Report on Group Legal Services, Report, 39 CALIF. S.B.J. 639, 
675 (1964). 
49. See SLICHTER, HEALY &: LlvERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON 
MANAGEMENT 761 (1960). 
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interest in, adequate legal services. Indeed, the courts have recog-
nized and relied upon the existence of these policy reasons for up-
holding such programs as the Brotherhood's. Judge Traynor ob-
served in his dissent in Hildebrand v. State Bar that the primary 
duty of the legal profession is to serve the public, and while the 
program of hiring attorneys may violate the language of the legal 
canons, it is consistent with their purpose of providing counsel to 
all who need it.110 However, if the unions were to confine themselves 
to those plans which conform to the requirements set out by the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 111 they 
should be able to accomplish their desired end without putting 
themselves in such an imposing and influential position. 
50. 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 225 P .2d 508, 519 (1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
51. 1ll m. 2d 891, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958). 
